Is Section 2739m-62 of the Kentucky Statutes Constitutional? by Vogeler, Alan Roth
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 3 Article 4
1939
Is Section 2739m-62 of the Kentucky Statutes
Constitutional?
Alan Roth Vogeler
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vogeler, Alan Roth (1939) "Is Section 2739m-62 of the Kentucky Statutes Constitutional?," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol27/iss3/4
NOTES
IS SECTION 2739m-62 OF THE KENTUCKY STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONAL?
Kentucky Statutes 2739m-621 says, "In addition to the pen-
alties herein provided (for not procuring a driver's license), if
any driver involved in any accident resulting in any damage
whatsoever to person or to property shall be ineligible to procure
operator's license herein provided for, or being eligible therefor
shall have failed to procure said operator's license, or having
procured same yet at the same time of such accident same shall
have been suspended or revoked, he shall be deemed prima facie
negligent in causing or contributing to cause such accident."
It is the purpose of this paper to examine that section of the
statutes, passed as a part of the Uniform Operator's License Act,
and to determine its scope, extent, effect, and constitutionality.
To do this we must first look at what is meant by the term,
"prima facie negligent".
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has dealt with this phrase
many times. In Price v. Commonwealth it said, "A legislative
body in making a law may provide what shall be a prima facie
case, and may place upon the defendant, in case a violation of the
law is shown, the burden of showing that the case falls within the
exceptions named in the ordinance."
Again, in Adams Express Co. v. Huntley,3 the court said,
"When a car in which stock is shipped breaks down, the break-
ing of the car makes out a prima facie case of negligence against
the carrier and warrants recovery if there is nothing in the record
to overcome the presumption of negligence."
Again, in Flynn v. Barnes,4 the court used these words,
"It is only necessary in a pleading that the plaintiff shall state
facts showing a prima facie case, and where the plaintiff shows
that he was examined by the school board, it will be presumed
Ky. Acts, 1936-3rd ex. ses., chap. 13.
' 123 Ky. 163, 94 S. W. 32 (1906).
3 145 Ky. 7, 139 S. W. 1084 (1911).
4156 Ky. 498, 161 S. W. 523 (1913).
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that the officers did their duty, and that he was sworn before he
was examined as required by statute."
And in Moore v. Hart, the court said, "Subsection 9 of sec-
tion 2739 of the statutes makes it prima faie evidence of negli-
gence to run an automobile exceeding 15 miles per hour upon any
highway of the state... (when passing through a town). Under
the statute, if a collision should occur, the plaintiff would make
out his case, after proving the fact of the collision followed by
the injury, by showing that the speed of the defendant's car was
more than 15 miles an hour."
Thus it is seen that the effect of the statute in question is to
raise a presumption in favor of the plaintiff in such a case.
W"hen, after showing the accident and the injury, the plaintiff
has proved that the defendant was operating his car without a
driver's license, he may rest and prove nothing else. Then the
defendant has to prove that the accident was not the result of his
not having a license, rather than having the plaintiff prove that
it was the result of this omission. A substantive right of the
defendant is affected. Where, under a certain set of facts, the
only evidence, other than the accident and injury, presented by
either party would be that defendant had no license to operate
an automobile, the plaintiff would recover.
Or, in the words of Wigmore, prima facie means a presump-
tion. "And the effect of a presumption is to prove sufficient
facts for the one to whom the benefit of the presumption accrues
that he is relieved of the duty of proving anything else but the
facts which give rise to the presumption, and then he may rest
and the burden of going forward shifts to the adversary. If the
adversary fails in his proof to present sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption, the verdict goes against him.' ' The statute
has raised, in effect, a duty to procure a driver's license owing
from every driver to every other person lawfully using the high-
ways, as a protection for the other users of the roads. And for
violation of this duty, the offender is negligent.
This, then, is a measure 'vhich most logically seems to have
been passed under the police power of the state. As the Court
5171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861 (1916). And see also, Cincinnati,
N. 0. & P. T. Ry. Co. v. Smith and Johnston, 155 Ky. 481, 159 S. W. 987
(1913); Gambill v. Com., 142 Ky. 312, 134 S. W. 160 (1910).
O5 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed., 1923) 2494, and cases cited note
17, p. 459.
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
of Appeals said in the case of Commonwealth v. Reinecke Coal
Mining Co.,7 "the subjects for the exercise of the police power
are, first, preservation of the public health; second, preservation
of the public morals; third, regulation of business enterprises;
fourth, regulation of civil rights of individuals; and, fifth, the
general welfare and safety of the citizens."
Again, in City of Newport v. Merkel Bros.,8 the court said,
"The legislature can, in the exercise of the police power, regulate
the use and driving of motor vehicles." And further, "The
police power of a state may be called into play when it is neces-
sary to protect the public health or public morals or public
safety".
But now let us pause a minute to look at the Constitution of
the state of Kentucky. Section 80, in providing that the gover-
nor of the state may call special sessions of the General Assembly,
also provides that, "When he shall convene the general assembly
it shall be by proclamation, stating the subjects to be considered,
and no other shall be considered."1 0
The Uniform Operator's License Act, of which Kentucky
Statute section 2739m-62 is a part, was passed at a special session
of the General Assembly called by the Governor in March, 1936.
The proclamation of the Governor in relation to this session is,
in substance, as follows:
"Whereas, the budgetary needs of the several departments, boards,
commissions and agencies of the government of Kentucky for the two
years beginning July 1, 1936, have not yet been determined by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; and
Whereas, such budgetary needs must be determined before the
amount of revenue to meet such needs can be ascertained:
Now, therefore, In order to determine the budgetary needs of the
several departments ... I... do issue this, my proclamation ... con-
Vening the General Assembly of Kentucky in Extraordinary Session...
for the sole purpose of considering the following subject:
1) To consider, determine and prepare a budget which will meet
the needs of the several departments ... for a period of two years from
July 1, 1936, and only said subject.""
7 117 Ky. 885, 894, 79 S. W. 287 (1904).
8156 Ky. 580, 161 S. W. 549 (1913).
9Com. v. Smith, 163 Ky. 227, 173 S. W. 340 (1915). And see also,
Loftus v. Iowa, 211 Iowa 566, 232 N. W. 412 (1930); Corn. v. Alger,
61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851); Davis v. State, 26 Ohio App. 340,
159 N. E. 575, 576 (1927); State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 824,
15 S. E. 1000 (1892).
10 Kentucky Constitution, see. 80.
Ky. Acts, 1936-3rd ex. ses. (preface).
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The Uniform Operator's License Act was chapter 13 of the
Kentucky Acts passed at this session, which was called as seen
above for the purpose of producing revenue to meet the budget
for the two years following July 1, 1936. And section 33 of this
act proclaimed:
"EMERIGENCY:
Whereas, the present state revenue does not meet the immediate
needs of the maintenance of the State government, its agencies and
subdivisions, an emergency is declared to exist and this Act shall be-
come a law on August 1, 1936."'
And the Uniform Operator's License Act as a whole has
been held valid by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.' 3 But since
the Kentucky Constitution before cited states that only such laws
as are within the purview of the call of the governor in conven-
ing an extra session of the General Assembly may be passed, and
the Court of Appeals has held unconstitutional laws passed at
such sessions which were not within this purpose,14 it follows that
the Kentucky Uniform Operator's License Act is a revenue
measure. If it is not a revenue measure, the Court of Appeals
would be in error in holding it constitutional. So, if this act were
a measure designed to protect the safety of the citizens, coming
under the police power, it, and section 2739m-62 must fall as
being contrary to the provisions of section 80 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
If, then, the Uniform Operator's License Act is constitu-
tional, it must be a revenue measure pure and simple, and is not
an exercise of the police power of the state as it has been defined
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
And, being a revenue measure, it can raise no duty owing
from one citizen to another, the breach of which will constitute
negligence.' As has been shown, this is a proper function of the
police power only. Unless a statute was passed with the inten-
tion of creating such a duty, breach of that statute is not
negligence.13
"Ky. Acts, 1936-3rd ex. ses., ch. 13, p. 151.
1 Com. v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231, 118 S. W. (2d) 558 (1938).
"4Richmond v. Lay, 261 Ky. 138, 87 S. W. (2d) 134 (1935).
lMoore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861 (1916); Fenton Dry
Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Hamilton, 226 Ky. 580, 11 S. W. (2d) 409
(1928); Prichard v. Collins, 228 Ky. 635, 15 S. W. (2d) 497 (1929).
16 Harper, Torts (1933), see. 78. And see Armstrong v. Sellers, 182
Ala. 582, 62 So. 28 (1913); Hemming v. New Haven, 82 Conn. 661, 74
Atl. 892, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 734 (1910); Lindsay v. Cecchi, 3 Boyce
(Del.) 133, 80 Atl. 523, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699 (1911); Black v. Moree,
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Therefore, the writer has come to the conclusion that section
2739m-62 of the Kentucky Statutes is unconstitutional, on either
of two grounds, First, if the Uniform Operator's License Act
was passed as an exercise of the police power, the entire act and
this particular section with it must fall as being contrary to sec-
tion 80 of the Kentucky Constitution. Or, second, if the Uni-
form Operator's License Act as a whole is constitutional, it is a
revenue measure not passed under the police power and cannot
raise a duty owing from one citizen to another to protect him; so
this section attempting to create such a duty is invalid.
ALAN R. VOGELER.
135 Tenn. 73, 185 S. W. 683, L. A. A. 1916 E, 1216 (1916); Dervin v.
Frenler, 9. Vt. 898, 100 AtI. 760 (1917); notes 43 A. L. R. 1153, 54
A. L. R. 374, 61 A. L. Rt. 1190,
